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955 
DECENTRALIZED PUBLIC LEDGER SYSTEMS 
AND SECURITIES LAW: NEW APPLICATIONS OF 
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
REVITALIZATION OF SECTIONS 11 AND 12(A)(2) 
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
INTRODUCTION 
When Bitcoin launched in 2009,1 it was the first virtual cryptocurrency 
to gain popularity and attain widespread use.2 Much attention has been paid 
to Bitcoin’s well-publicized advances and setbacks as the world’s foremost 
virtual currency. 3 Less attention has been paid, however, to the 
decentralized public ledger technology that enables Bitcoin to function.4 
That technology is just as innovative as Bitcoin itself.5 Decentralized public 
ledgers are a revolution in digital data storage and have the “potential to 
fundamentally shift the way in which society operates.”6  
This Note will examine one such societal shift—a change in how 
shareholders access and assert their rights the securities markets. 
Specifically, this Note proposes that decentralized public securities ledgers 
will enable private shareholders to more fully access the protections of 
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 in cases of securities 
fraud.  
To facilitate understanding of this new technology, Section I describes 
the history and function of decentralized public ledger networks. It provides 
an overview of common ledger formats, and details current and future 
applications of the technology. 
Section II examines how decentralized public ledgers relate to the 
securities markets at both the national and state levels. It details how the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) plans to implement and 
                                                 
1.  Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://perma.cc/62TW-C5VP. 
2.  Id.; see also Tara Mandjee, Bitcoin, Its Legal Classification and Its Regulatory Framework, 
15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 5 (2014). 
3.  Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED MAG. (Nov. 23, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/JB9S-U57H; see also Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 
2014), https://perma.cc/XY2F-PWBU (detailing the formation, rise in popularity, and impact of Bitcoin 
as both a technological innovation and a virtual cryptocurrency). 
4.  Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 569, 577 (2015). 
5.  Wallace, supra note 3.   
6.  Aaron Wright & Primavera De Fillippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise 
of Lex Cryptographia 2 (Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/P7BQ-L8ZL. 
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regulate the use of decentralized public ledgers and explains how Delaware 
is currently using the technology to create new classes of corporate stock. 
Lastly, Section III of this Note posits that applying decentralized public 
ledger technology to securities transactions will increase the number of 
plaintiffs who are capable of achieving standing under Sections 11 and 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”). After detailing 
the history of Section 11, Section 12(a)(2), and the tracing doctrine, Section 
III explains how decentralized public securities ledgers will transform the 
tracing doctrine from a nigh-insurmountable pleading burden to a simple 
records search. It will help a wider scope of plaintiffs meet the judicially-
imposed tracing doctrine. Although making this burden easier to fulfill will 
expand the potential plaintiff pool, and thus may create logistical issues for 
courts and defendants, the internal structure and pleading requirements of 
the Securities Act will effectively limit frivolous suits. This, in turn, will 
better fulfill the statutory language and remedial intent of Sections 11 and 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.  
I. DECENTRALIZED PUBLIC LEDGER SYSTEMS: A HISTORY OF 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC INNOVATION AND APPLICATION 
Decentralized public ledgers merge traditional record-keeping methods 
with technological advances to create a new system for preserving and 
sharing data.7 Because decentralized public ledgers are a relatively new 
innovation, Part I of this Note traces their development and explains core 
features of the technology. It then explores the different formats that digital 
ledgers can take. Part I concludes by examining current and future 
applications of decentralized public ledger technology—including how 
decentralized ledgers facilitate the use of digital currencies, smart contracts, 
and financial transactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 577–78. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/8
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A. The Development and Function of Decentralized Public Ledgers 
Decentralized public ledgers are the technological synthesis of over 
twenty years of advancements in cryptographic algorithms and computer 
networking.8 Prior to these advancements, it was impossible for disparate 
individuals to agree that an Internet transaction was valid without a trusted 
centralized authority present to verify the transaction.9 For example, an 
Internet user could not digitally transfer money to another user without an 
intermediary to confirm that the money being transferred actually existed in 
the quantities and format represented.10 It is because of this problem, known 
in computer science circles as the “Byzantine Generals Problem,”11 that 
services such as PayPal were invented.12 PayPal and other transactional 
management services perform an intermediary role by evaluating and 
confirming the validity of online transactions.13 
Decentralized public ledgers, however, enable secure Internet 
transactions and data storage without the need for a third-party authority to 
monitor and confirm validity.14 They allow unrelated groups of people to 
independently form a consensus regarding the validity of a transaction.15 
Transactions performed via decentralized public ledgers are thus often 
called “trustless,” because they do not require participants to trust in each 
                                                 
8.  Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 2. 
9.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 577–78. 
10.  Id. 
11.  See Debraj Ghosh, How the Byzantine General Sacked the Castle: A Look into Blockchain, 
MEDIUM (Apr. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/V8PG-EG8W. See also Jim Gray, Notes on Data Base 
Operating Systems, in LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 394, 465 (G. Goos & J. Hartmanis eds., 
1978), https://perma.cc/M6LY-VT4C. The Byzantine Generals Problem is also known as the “Two 
Generals Problem” and is often explained via the following hypothetical: two generals are each 
preparing their troops to attack a common enemy. The two teams of troops are situated on separate hills 
that flank the common enemy. The generals of each troop can communicate with each other only by 
messenger. Each message sent between the two generals is risky, as it could be intercepted by the enemy. 
The two generals have agreed to attack together because a successful attack requires both teams of troops 
to attack the enemy simultaneously, but they have not agreed on a time for the attack to begin. The issue, 
then, is that the two generals must agree on an attack time and each general must know that the other 
general knows they have agreed—which is a complicated transaction, as a receipt of message delivery 
can be lost as easily as the original message. Thus, a potentially infinite chain of messages is required to 
reach consensus. See also E. A. Akkoyunlu, K. Ekanadham & R. V. Huber, Some Constraints and 
Tradeoffs in the Design of Network Communications, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ACM SYMPOSIUM 
ON OPERATING SYSTEMS PRINCIPLES 67, 73 (J.C. Browne & Juan Rodriguez-Rosell eds., 1975) 
(explicating the problem for the first time); Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing the 
concept); Leslie Lampert, The Byzantine Generals Problem, 4 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON PROGRAMMING 
LANGUAGES AND SYSTEMS 382 (July 1982) (examining the history, function, and application of the 
Byzantine Generals Problem to digital code and cryptography). 
12.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 577; see also About, PAYPAL, https://perma.cc/ZVZ2-AF38. 
13.  How to Use PayPal? How Does PayPal Work? TECHWELKIN, https://perma.cc/G8Y2-
P2XD. 
14.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 577–79. 
15.  Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger 
Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 197 (2016). 
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other, or to trust in a third-party intermediary, for an exchange to take 
place.16  
Decentralized public ledgers enable trustless transactions because of 
three key features: decentralized consensus mechanisms, distributed data 
storage, and cryptographic algorithms.17  
Decentralized consensus mechanisms are a technological advance that 
enable trustless consensus as to the validity of a transaction.18 These 
mechanisms have different forms, depending on the digital structure of the 
decentralized ledger, but they all function in the same basic manner.19 
Before a transaction or piece of data can be digitally stored in the 
decentralized public ledger, the ledger’s members must come to a consensus 
regarding the transaction or data’s validity.20 In this manner, the ledger 
members supplant a centralized authority that can confirm transactions.21 
Rather than having a service such as PayPal validate a transaction, the 
members themselves vouch for its legitimacy.22 Once a transaction reaches 
consensus, it is permanently stored in the ledger.23  
Data storage is thus the next key innovation in decentralized public 
ledgers.24 When a transaction requires a trusted central authority for its 
validation, the authority is the only entity that maintains a complete record 
of the transaction.25 For instance, PayPal’s individual users cannot each 
access a full record of all confirmed PayPal transactions.26 Rather, PayPal 
itself has that information stored on its own server.27 The network of PayPal 
users, and the data accompanying their online transactions, thus constitute 
a centralized network.28 Without PayPal’s central storage, maintenance, and 
protection of the complete transactional records on its internal servers, the 
network would be unable to function.29  
                                                 
16.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 577; see also Jessie Cheng & Benjamin Geva, Understanding Block 
Chain and Distributed Financial Technology: New Rails for Payments and an Analysis of Article 4A of 
the of the UCC, BUS. L. TODAY (Mar. 2016). 
17.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 197. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. at 198–99. 
20.  Id. at 197–98; see also Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer 
Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 (2014).  
21.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 577–78. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 197–98. 
24.  Sloane Brakeville & Bhargav Perepa, Blockchain Basics: Introduction to Distributed 
Ledgers, IBM DEVELOPERWORKS (May 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/8CL9-76S7; see also Kiviat, supra 
note 4, at 577–80. 
25.  Brakeville & Perepa, supra note 24. 
26.  TECHWELKIN, supra note 13. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 577. 
29.  TECHWELKIN, supra note 13. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/8
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Decentralized public ledgers, in contrast, gain their name from a 
decentralized network structures.30 When ledger members reach a 
consensus as to the validity of a transaction, that transaction is stored in each 
member’s copy of the ledger, which is saved on each member’s individual 
computer.31 Each member of the ledger thus retains a complete record of all 
ledger transactions at all times, rather than trusting the record to a single 
centralized authority.32  
The decentralized nature of public ledger networks supports the third key 
feature of the ledgers: cryptographic algorithms.33 Decentralized public 
ledgers utilize a “probabilistic approach” to protect their data.34 When 
information travels over a decentralized network and can only be stored via 
group consensus, the information becomes more “transparent and 
verifiable.”35 Potential attackers attempting to flood a ledger with false 
information, either by entering completely falsified data or by entering valid 
transactions multiple times, are blocked from doing so. Such actions are 
unlikely to gain consensus across the network.36 Further, unlike ledger data 
stored in centralized networks, a decentralized public ledger’s data cannot 
be altered merely by gaining access to the network or server.37 As a 
decentralized public ledger is independently stored on the computers of 
everyone involved in the ledger, hacking or tampering with one member’s 
ledger will merely create an inconsistency that can be easily exposed and 
resolved by comparing it to the ledgers of other members.38 As yet another 
layer of protection, ledger networks are frequently protected by innovative 
defense algorithms.39  
 These three key features of decentralized public ledgers—decentralized 
consensus mechanisms, distributed data storage, and cryptographic 
algorithms—are a true revolution in computer technology.40 Decentralized 
public ledgers “enable [disparate] ‘people to agree on a particular state of 
affairs and record that agreement in a secure and verifiable manner’” for the 
first time in technological history.41 The result is an online list of 
                                                 
30.  David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized Public-Ledger 
Currency Platforms (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 685, 2014). 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id.; see also Kiviat, supra note 4, at 577–580. 
33.  Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 1. 
34.  Id. at 6. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Brakeville & Perepa, supra note 24. 
38.  Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 6–8. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. at 1–2. 
41.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 197; see also Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 4–5, 5 n.15 
(stating that decentralized public ledger technology uses public key cryptography for authentication and 
economic incentives to ensure the network maintains the technology).  
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transactions that is public, permanent, trustless,42 and resistant to fraud or 
error because it is “maintained by no one . . . available to everyone . . . [and] 
maintained by a consensus protocol.”43  
B. Decentralized Public Ledger Formats 
Although decentralized public ledgers share basic structural 
characteristics, those characteristics can be organized in a variety of 
formats.44 Most notably, the form of consensus protocol varies depending 
on the design given to the decentralized ledger by its programmers and 
users.45 The ultimate purpose of the ledger, whether it is to record currency 
transactions, administer contract agreements, or document financial 
transactions, also influences its format.46  
Bitcoin’s “blockchain” is currently the most popular format for a 
distributed ledger system.47 The blockchain is a computer network that 
encrypts each incoming ledger transaction and aggregates it into a group of 
similarly-timed transactions, termed a “block.”48 Each block serves as a data 
storage container that connects in chronological order to the previous block 
in the transactional chain.49 A new block can only connect to the 
transactional chain after ledger users reach consensus as to the block’s 
validity.50  
Bitcoin’s blockchain uses a proof-of-work consensus model to verify its 
transactions. A proof-of-work consensus model “require[s] the client 
requesting the service prove that some work has been done” before they are 
permitted to store their transaction in the ledger.51 For Bitcoin, ledger users 
achieve consensus by utilizing the network’s computational power to solve 
complex mathematical problems. When the problems are solved, the 
transactional block is validated and added to the chain.52 Once connected to 
the chain, the transactional information contained in the block cannot be 
permanently altered or deleted without accessing the ledger copy stored on 
every computer connected to the network—a nearly impossible feat, given 
                                                 
42.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 577. 
43.  Fairfield, supra note 20, at 36. 
44.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 198–99. 
45.  Id. at 197–99. 
46.  Id. at 200. 
47.  Mandjee, supra note 2. 
48.  Christina Batog, Blockchain: A Proposal to Reform High Frequency Trading Regulation, 
33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 755 (2015). 
49.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 197. 
50.  Id. at 198. 
51.  Pedro Franco, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND 
ECONOMICS 102 (2015).  
52.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 198. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/8
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that millions of computers are connected to the Bitcoin network at any 
moment.53  
Bitcoin’s blockchain format and proof-of-work consensus model has 
achieved immense popularity and become nearly synonymous with 
decentralized public ledgers. Decentralized ledgers can take other forms, 
however. Ripple is a decentralized ledger that validates transactions by 
using a “unique node list” rather than a proof-of-work consensus model.54 
In the unique node list format, potential transactions are aggregated into lists 
that are then distributed to a random subsection of network users.55 The 
subset of users vote on the prospective transactions, and only those that are 
approved by a consensus of eighty percent or more are entered into the 
permanent ledger.56  
In another consensus model, termed the “proof-of-stake” model, 
transaction validation also depends on majority voting. However, voting 
rights are granted as a percentage of the number of resources each computer 
makes available to the network. Thus, network users who choose to store 
network files on their computers possess more voting power than users who 
choose not to store network files.57  
As these examples demonstrate, decentralized public ledgers can take 
nearly any form their programmers and users desire. While most current 
ledgers base their consensus format on network power and voting, other 
consensus models are currently in development.58 
C. Current and Future Uses for Decentralized Public Ledgers 
Although virtual cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin were the first and most 
popular use for decentralized public ledgers, the technology can be 
integrated into almost any field that requires data storage.59 One such 
application, the smart contract, has become well-established in the past two 
years.60 Smart contracts utilize information stored in decentralized public 
                                                 
53.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 579. 
54.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 198; see also Bryant Gehring, How Ripple Works, RIPPLE (Oct. 16, 
2014), http://perma.cc/UM6B-4EPU (describing the Ripple’s database structure and unique node 
protocols). 
55.  Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The Bitcoin Question: Currency Versus Trust-Less Transfer 
Technology (OECD Working Papers on Fin., Ins. and Private Pensions, No. 37, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/ATY3-RJZC. 
56.  JO VAN DE VELDE ET AL., EUROCLEAR & OLIVER WYMAN, BLOCKCHAIN IN CAPITAL 
MARKETS: THE PRIZE AND THE JOURNEY (2016). 
57.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 199. 
58.  See, e.g., IDDO BENTOV, CHARLES LEE, ALEX MIZRAHI & MENI ROSENFELD, PROOF OF 
ACTIVITY: EXTENDING BITCOIN’S PROOF OF WORK VIA PROOF OF STAKE (2014), 
https://perma.cc/5JVK-BVEA.  
59.  Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 1.  
60.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 201. 
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ledgers to digitally perform certain actions when a triggering condition is 
recorded in the ledger.61 In this manner, smart contracts encode the logic of 
contractual clauses into decentralized public ledgers. The ledger can then 
automatically facilitate, verify, and enforce the performance of the 
contract.62 Parties can confirm that a contract condition has occurred 
without the need for a third party to oversee and validate its occurrence.63 
Smart contracts thus increase the security of contracts while simultaneously 
reducing their transactional costs.64 Smart contracts are currently in use to 
enforce common contractual conditions, such as payment terms, liens, or 
confidentiality.65 Smart contract capabilities are expected to expand as the 
technology continues to develop in coming years.66   
For example, a smart contract can be implemented into a decentralized 
public ledger that stores information regarding property ownership.67 When 
new data is entered into the ledger and achieves consensus, the smart 
contract enables each node in the distributed public ledger to act as a title 
registry and escrow.68 Changes of ownership will automatically be stored in 
the ledger’s data chain, via the terms of the smart contract programmed into 
the ledger itself.69  
Another example of a current smart contract is one programmed into the 
account of a Bitcoin user. A user can construct the contract so that when a 
certain number of Bitcoin transactions are stored in the blockchain, the 
ledger will automatically transfer the assets those Bitcoins represent into a 
specified banking account.70 In addition, some Bitcoin-based smart 
contracts enable automatic title transfer. If a Bitcoin user wants to sell a 
general property title, for instance, a smart contract can be entered into the 
ledger that will automatically transfer the title to the buyer. The trigger for 
                                                 
61.  Batog, supra note 48, at 756; see also Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships 
on Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997), https://perma.cc/UL7S-QDYA (predicting the 
development of smart contract technology). 
62.  ALEX TAPSCOTT & DON TAPSCOTT, THE BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE 
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD, 72–83 (2016). 
63.  Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 10. 
64.  Peter Coy & Olga Kharif, This is Your Company On Blockchain, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 
2016), https://perma.cc/2E4E-SG6Y. 
65.  Szabo, supra note 61.  
66.  CHRISTOPHER D. CLACK, VIKRAM A. BAKSHI & LEE BRAINE, BARCLAYS BANK, SMART 
CONTRACT TEMPLATES: FOUNDATIONS, DESIGN LANDSCAPE, AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS (2016), 
https://perma.cc/5LDX-E4WP.  
67.  NICK SZABO, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INST., SECURE PROPERTY TITLES WITH OWNER 
AUTHORITY  (2005), https://perma.cc/WS9Z-KTDP.  
68.  Id.; see also Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 10–12 (providing more detail about smart 
contract title applications).  
69.  Id. 
70.  Fairfield, supra note 20, at 38; see also Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 10 n.46; 
VITALIK BUTERIN, A NEXT GENERATION SMART CONTRACT & DECENTRALIZED APPLICATION 
PLATFORM (2015), https://perma.cc/R5JN-NRU6. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/8
  
 
 
 
 
2018] DECENTRALIZED PUBLIC LEDGER SYSTEMS 963 
 
 
 
the execution of this smart contract occurs when the buyer transfers the sale 
price of the title into the seller’s Bitcoin account and the proof-or-work 
consensus model has verified its credibility.71        
Additional types of smart contracts currently in use include assurance 
contracts,72 contracts regulating the transfer of financial instruments,73 and 
other programmable transactions in which the distributed ledger’s nodes can 
monitor the actions that trigger the smart contract’s execution.74 Several 
open source projects have recently formed with the intent of creating 
programming languages that can support more sophisticated types of 
contracts—contracts with varying, complexly-coded terms that bind parties, 
via a distributed public ledger, to promises of future action.75 
Due to their unique capacity for immediate and trustless exchange of 
value, decentralized public ledgers also hold great promise for the financial 
markets. Decentralized public ledgers dramatically lower the transaction 
costs associated with digital value exchange.76 Moving value, even in its 
digital form, takes money and time. This money and time can be traced 
largely to the need for centralized authorities to verify digital transactions. 
For example, the Automated Clearing House is a centralized verification 
authority that supports over twenty percent of all electronic payments made 
in the United States.77 More than $40 trillion moves through the Automated 
Clearing House each year in over 25.5 billion discrete transactions.78 Each 
transaction through the Automated Clearing House takes an average of two 
to three days to process, and servicing fees for that processing range from 
six to nine percent. In 2015, Automated Clearing House users paid $36 
billion in servicing fees.79 Banks, a commonly used centralized verification 
authority, spend close to $100–150 billion per year on information 
technology and securities operations meant to verify, protect, and store 
customer data.80 In the stock markets, post-trade and securities servicing 
                                                 
71.  Reyes, supra note 15, at 201. 
72.  Clack, Bakshi, & Braine, supra note 66. 
73.  David Wigan, Bitcoin Technology Will Disrupt Derivatives, Says Banker, IFR ASIA (June 
11, 2016), https://perma.cc/G8MT-4596.  
74.  Rory Ross, Smart Money: Blockchains are the Future of the Internet, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 12, 
2015), https://perma.cc/WL6L-ZL4J. 
75.  See Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6, at 12. Ethereum, Counterparty, and Mastercoin are 
the three most significant open source projects for smart contracts. Id. 
76.  Mandjee, supra note 2, at 61–62. 
77.  History and Network Statistics, NACHA: THE ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS ASS’N, 
https://perma.cc/7GL8-NDJM. (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). 
78.  OVERALL ACH VOLUME MORE THAN 25.5 BILLION IN 2016, NACHA: THE ELECTRONIC 
PAYMENTS ASS’N (2017), https://perma.cc/P9JQ-3NHS.  
79.  ACH Volume Increases 5.3 Percent in 1st Quarter 2015, NACHA: THE ELECTRONIC 
PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, https://perma.cc/F2GM-8UXH.  
80.  Shepherd, supra note 56, at 20. 
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fees charged by brokers to verify securities transactions total approximately 
$100 billion per year.81  
Decentralized public ledgers, in contrast, enable digital transactions to 
take place almost immediately. There is no need for processing time by an 
intermediary. As soon as ledger users reach a consensus, the transaction is 
verified and secured. Although decentralized public ledgers do require some 
transaction costs to cover their creation and maintenance, the average 
transaction cost in distributed ledger markets is currently just two percent.82 
This lower amount allows for potential cost savings of $24 billion per year 
to consumers who switch their online transactions from traditional modes 
of digital value exchange to decentralized public ledgers.83  
II. DECENTRALIZED PUBLIC LEDGERS AND THE SECURITIES 
MARKET: A MAJOR TECHNOLOGICAL SHIFT 
Part II of this Note extends Part I’s discussion of decentralized public 
ledgers in the financial markets by delving deeper into the technology’s 
applications in the securities markets. First, it examines the ways in which 
distributed public ledger technology can be employed in the securities 
context. It then considers how both the national and state securities markets, 
as represented by the SEC and Delaware, plan to implement and regulate 
distributed public ledgers.  
A. How to Secure a Security: Decentralized Public Ledgers and Stocks 
Although decentralized public ledgers have the potential to serve 
multiple functions within the securities context, their most obvious 
application is as a data storage system to record and track the movement of 
securities transactions.84 Currently, when a buyer purchases a security, he 
receives a certificate or similar document that confirms how many shares of 
stock he purchased, the name of the issuer from whom the stock was 
purchased, and the purchase price.85 This transaction is recorded in multiple 
fora. The securities issuer retains a record of stockholders, as well as brokers 
                                                 
81.  Id. 
82.  Kiviat, supra note 4, at 586. 
83.  Id. at 587. 
84.  KURT MATTSON, A.S. PRATT & SONS, DELAWARE LOOKS AT LEGAL CLASSIFICATION FOR 
BLOCKCHAIN SHARES (2016). 
85.  Stephanie Powers, How to Read a Stock Certificate, SAPLING (Feb. 25, 2009), 
https://www.sapling.com/4811405/read-stock-certificate. See also Stock Certificates, Proving 
Ownership, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/74W9-A8T8. (last visited Nov. 12, 
2017). 
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or dealers that were involved in the purchase.86 Brokers and dealers also 
maintain their own records of their transactions. 
If the securities markets employed decentralized public ledgers to 
manage transactions, however, all of these records could be consolidated on 
a decentralized network via blockchain or another ledger format.87 As in the 
broader financial markets, transactional times and costs would decrease for 
securities purchasers using decentralized ledger technology.88 While such a 
development may negatively impact current transactional intermediaries, 
such as stockbrokers and dealers, it would yield great benefits for 
consumers.89 Decreased costs, and the unique data safety net engendered by 
the decentralized structure of public ledgers, would likely increase 
consumer confidence and participation in the securities markets.90 
As the technology continues to develop, smart contracts are also 
expected to become a component of digital securities transactions.91 For 
instance, a smart contract could be embedded into a decentralized securities 
ledger and direct the ledger’s nodes to automatically buy or sell certain 
stocks when those stocks reach a price set by the network user.92 While these 
innovations are not yet part of the American securities markets, industry 
experts predict that such developments are not far off.93 
B. National Securities Markets: The SEC’s Response to Decentralized 
Public Ledger Technology 
Spurred by the immense popularity of Bitcoin and similar applications 
of decentralized public ledger technology in the financial markets, the SEC 
has begun to address decentralized ledger technology in the context of 
securities transactions.94 In 2013, the SEC founded its Digital Currency 
Working Group to consider regulatory issues related to virtual 
cryptocurrencies.95 The name has since been changed to the Distributed 
Ledger Technology Working Group (the “Group”), as it now addresses 
public ledger technologies in contexts other than just currency.96 A major 
concern for the Group is the “application of existing laws to [B]itcoin 
                                                 
86.  Id. 
87.  Mattson, supra note 84. 
88.  See Michael del Castillo, How the SEC’s Blockchain Lead is Defining Future Regulation, 
COINDESK (Nov. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/BVJ2-B6NY.  
89.  Id. 
90.  Mattson, supra note 84. 
91.  Andrea Tinianow, Mark Smith, Caitlin Long, & Marco Santori, Delaware’s 2017 
Resolution: Make Blockchain a Reality, COINDESK (Jan. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/8KDW-CSUZ. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Castillo, supra note 88. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. 
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financial instruments.”97 For example, in 2016 the SEC began working 
through legal issues with two different exchanges hoping to host Bitcoin 
exchange traded funds.  
For the SEC, however, the most significant issue related to decentralized 
public ledger technology is not Bitcoin-based products sold over exchanges. 
Rather, it is crypto-stocks, stored and traded on decentralized public ledgers, 
which are poised to significantly disrupt and alter SEC practices. In 
December of 2015, the SEC approved Overstock.com’s plan to issue 
securities on a “custom-built blockchain stock exchange.”98 At the time, the 
SEC proposed regulations on the transfer agents who would manage those 
securities.99 These regulations have not yet been ratified, however, due to 
extensive debate regarding how decentralized ledger technology, 
particularly in the form of blockchain applications, should be classified in 
the SEC’s regulatory scheme.100 As former SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo 
White noted in a June 2016 speech on the subject, the key regulatory issue 
facing the SEC is “whether blockchain applications require registration 
under existing Commission regulatory regimes, such as those for transfer 
agents or clearing agencies,” or whether the technology is singular enough 
to warrant an entirely new registration and regulation system.101 The SEC 
made little progress on resolving these questions between June and 
November of 2016. Consequently, in November 2016, Mary Jo White stated 
that to “the extent there are real benefits to participants in the financial 
services sector and their customers, especially to back-office functionality, 
we are [still] considering whether this technology will obviate certain 
services and participants or, rather, be adopted into current 
infrastructures.”102 Although current SEC Chairman Jay Clayton stated in 
July 2017 that certain types of ledgers can fall under the federal definition 
of a security, including Initial Coin Offerings and Token Sales, the SEC has 
not revealed how it plans to classify other common applications of the 
technology.103 Given extensive actor interest in integrating distributed 
                                                 
97.  Id. 
98.  Castillo, supra note 88; see also Mattson, supra note 84; Andrew Harnik, SEC Approves 
Plan to Issue Stock Via Bitcoin’s Blockchain, WIRED (Dec. 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/748D-QQYY 
(explaining how Overstock’s blockchain stocks were developed). 
99.  Andrew Harnik, SEC Approves Plan to Issue Stock Via Bitcoin’s Blockchain, WIRED (Dec. 
15, 2015), https://perma.cc/748D-QQYY.  
100.  Ruoke Yang, When is Bitcoin a Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 
99, 117–18 (Dec. 2013). 
101.  Mattson, supra note 84. 
102.  Mary Jo White, Opening Remarks at the Fintech Forum, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (Nov. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/5422-PM79; see also Castillo, supra note 88 (analyzing 
Mary Jo White’s remarks). 
103.  SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jul. 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-
131.  
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public ledgers into the securities markets, the SEC will have to determine 
its stance on these significant issues sooner rather than later.104 
C. State Securities Markets: Delaware’s Technological Push 
Although the SEC has yet to clarify its perspective on the topic, 
Delaware is actively pursuing the use of decentralized public ledger 
technology to issue and track corporate stock transactions.105 As part of its 
Delaware Blockchain Initiative, the state has partnered with Symbiont, a 
smart contract start-up, to create a system that can “move the process of 
registering companies, tracking share movements, and managing 
shareholder communications into a digital environment.”106 The state 
government is in the process of creating a new type of corporate share, the 
“distributed ledger share,” that will join traditional certificated and 
uncertificated shares.107 Within the next year, all Delaware corporations will 
be able to issue distributed ledger shares.108 This development will have far-
reaching impacts, as more than sixty-six percent of the Fortune 500, and 
eighty-five percent of all initial public offerings, incorporate in Delaware.109 
Delaware’s governor, Jack Markell, noted in a July 2016 speech that such 
shares will enable “immediate clearance, [and] immediate settlement,” 
without relying on intermediaries such as clearinghouses, custodians, 
exchanges, and fiduciaries.110 A central component of the initiative is the 
establishment of a legal foundation for the entire lifecycle of a corporate 
share.111  
In addition, Delaware is posed to integrate smart contracts into its 
distributed public ledger in 2017.112 This will enable companies to file 
documents directly onto the distributed ledger, including “a large majority 
of the ‘foundational’ documents of finance” such as incorporation 
documents and Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) filings.113 Delaware 
officials believe that its distributed public ledger options will “enable[e] 
significant improvements to the financial industry’s workflows.”114 
                                                 
104.  Castillo, supra note 88.  
105.  Marco A. Santori, Why Cos. Must Pay Attention to Delaware’s Blockchain Plan, LAW 360 
(May 2016), https://perma.cc/MF7L-P6L2; see also Tinianow, Smith, Long, & Santori, supra note 91 
(providing an updated perspective on Delaware’s progress). 
106.  Mattson, supra note 84. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Santori, supra note 105. 
109.  Tinianow, Smith, Long, & Santori, supra note 91.  
110.  Mattson, supra note 84. 
111.  Id. 
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III. DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SHARES AND THE TRACING DOCTRINE: 
RESURRECTING SECTIONS 11 AND 12(A)(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 
1933 
As decentralized public ledgers are a tremendous technological 
advancement that will engender significant changes in the financial and 
legal spheres, it is perhaps unsurprising that such technology has been the 
subject of considerable analysis from experts in varying fields.115 In the 
legal context, much scholarly attention has been devoted to the regulatory 
effects of decentralized public ledgers.116 This Part of the Note will evaluate 
a different legal effect of decentralized ledgers, however—their potential to 
facilitate claims brought under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities 
Act. First, this Part details the history and mechanics of Sections 11 and 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Next, it explains how judicial interpretation 
of these sections has imposed a tracing requirement for shareholders seeking 
relief following fraudulent securities transactions. Lastly, it posits that using 
decentralized public ledgers to facilitate securities transactions will, for the 
first time, enable shareholders seeking relief under Section 11 or 12(a)(2) to 
realistically meet the burden of the judicially-imposed tracing doctrine.  
A. Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act: A History 
Congress enacted the Securities Act in 1933 as a response to the 
disastrous market crash of 1929.117 It was intended to foster transparency by 
requiring companies offering securities to make substantive disclosures.118 
To incentivize corporate compliance with the disclosure requirements, the 
Securities Act incorporates public and private enforcement mechanisms for 
instances of disclosure fraud.119 This Note focuses on two sections of the 
Securities Act that describe private enforcement mechanisms: Section 11 
and Section 12(a)(2).120  
1. Section 11 of the Securities Act 
Section 11 details how a security purchaser can bring a private claim 
against companies that have made material misstatements or omissions in 
their registration statements.121 It was included in the Securities Act to 
                                                 
115.  See, e.g., Mandjee, supra note 2; Kiviat, supra note 4; Wright & De Fillippi, supra note 6; 
Reyes, supra note 15; Szabo, supra note 67. 
116.  See Reyes, supra note 15. 
117.  JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3–5 (2013). 
118.  Id.  
119.  Id.  
120.  Id.  
121.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).  
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motivate securities issuers to provide full, truthful disclosures to securities 
buyers.122 Part (a) of Section 11 states that 
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became 
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted 
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring 
such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition 
he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, 
in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue—  
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; 
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar 
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part 
of the registration statement with respect to which his liability is 
asserted; 
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration 
statement as being or about to become a director, person performing 
similar functions, or partner; 
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose 
profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with 
his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of 
the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any 
report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration 
statement, with respect to the statement in such registration 
statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared 
or certified by him; 
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security. 
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made 
generally available to its security holders an earning statement 
covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the 
effective date of the registration statement, then the right of recovery 
under this subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person 
acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in the 
registration statement or relying upon the registration statement and 
not knowing of such omission, but such reliance may be established 
without proof of the reading of the registration statement by such 
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person.123 
A critical component of Section 11 is its liability standard.124 Shareholders 
who purchase securities pursuant to a materially misleading registration 
statement possess a strict liability claim under Section 11.125 Thus, such 
shareholders may sue entities associated with the inaccurate registration 
statement’s release for either purposeful or innocent misstatements.126  
To bring a claim under Section 11, plaintiff shareholders must prove that 
the registration statement in question contained a material misstatement or 
omission.127 If the shareholder purchased their securities within twelve 
months after the effective date of the registration statement at issue, they 
need not prove reliance on the statement to make a claim.128 On the other 
hand, if shareholders purchased their securities more than twelve months 
after the effective date of the registration statement at issue, and the issuer 
has already distributed an earnings statement, the shareholders must 
demonstrate reliance upon the registration statement.129  
Several defenses are available to defendants in Section 11 suits. 
Defendants may invoke the statute of limitations.130 Defendants may also 
dispute that the alleged misstatement or omission was material.131 They can 
bring a due diligence defense. Alternately, they can try to prove that 
plaintiffs were aware of the alleged misstatement or omission and relied 
upon the registration statement anyway.132 
If the plaintiffs in a Section 11 case succeed in proving their claim and 
overcoming any defenses, they are entitled to damages equaling the 
difference between the amount paid for their securities and the actual value 
of the securities at the time of the suit.133 The burden then shifts to the 
defendants to show that the security’s value depreciation was due to reasons 
other than the misleading statements or omissions.134 Should the defendants 
fail to make such a defense, they are jointly and severally liable for any 
judgment given and have the right to contribution.135 
                                                 
123.  15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
124.  Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1983).  
125.  Id.  
126.  Id.  
127.  Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 
Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 435 (2000). 
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. 
133.  15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012). 
134.  Id. 
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2. Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act 
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act is similar in structure and intent to 
Section 11.136 However, while Section 11 involves misstatements or 
omissions in registration statements, Section 12(a)(2) involves 
misstatements or omissions in a prospectus or oral communication.137 The 
section states that 
[a]ny person who . . . offers or sells a security . . . by the use of any 
means or instruments of transportation or communication in 
interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral 
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact 
or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading . . . shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing 
such security from him. 138 
Thus, to make a Section 12(a)(2) claim, plaintiff shareholders must show 
the existence of a material misstatement or omission in a prospectus or oral 
communication.139 They must also show that they did not know of the 
misstatement or omission at the time the security was purchased.140  
In response to such claims, defendants can argue that they “did not know, 
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known” of the alleged 
misstatement or omission.141 Defendants may also attempt to prove that the 
alleged misstatement or omission did not affect the security’s price or 
performance.142 If defendants do not prove their defenses, plaintiffs may 
receive rescission if they still possess the security, or damages if it has 
already been resold.143 
B. Development of the Tracing Doctrine 
In the years since Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act were 
drafted, judicial interpretation has augmented their pleading standards to 
include a tracing requirement.144 Tracing is a “judicially created requirement 
that to access [S]ections 11 and 12(a)(2) shareholders must plead and prove 
                                                 
136.  15. U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2012). 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for 
Fraudulent Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 851 (1991). 
142.  See id. 
143.  15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2012). 
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that they bought shares issued either ‘in’ the public offering for which the 
registration statement or prospectus was issued, or ‘pursuant to’ that 
offering.”145 The tracing doctrine is ultimately a requirement of standing.146 
Unless a plaintiff can establish direct connections between his securities and 
the registration statements or prospectuses containing misstatements or 
omissions, courts will not grant him standing to bring a case under either 
Section 11 or Section 12(a)(2).147 
The tracing doctrine began as an attempt to resolve perceived judicial 
confusion over which types of shareholders were entitled to recover under 
Section 11.148 There are two types of shareholders who can potentially bring 
a claim under Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2): 1) original shareholders, or 
those who were the first purchasers of the security offered; and 2) 
aftermarket shareholders, or those who purchased the security in the 
secondary trading markets.149 Because aftermarket shareholders often 
purchase securities that have been held by multiple prior purchasers, 
sometimes years after the securities were first issued, it can be difficult for 
such shareholders to prove that their securities were issued under a 
particular offering.150 Thus, the courts imposed the tracing doctrine 
requirement to resolve whether or not these aftermarket shareholders were 
entitled to recover under Sections 11 or 12(a)(2).151 
Barnes v. Osofsky was one of the first cases to require that plaintiffs trace 
their securities to a specified offering.152 A Section 11 case out of the Second 
Circuit, Barnes held that although the language of Section 11 does not limit 
standing to only original shareholders, Section 11 remedies are nevertheless 
only available to original shareholders.153 The court noted that since the 
purpose of Section 11 was to “[e]nsure full and accurate disclosure through 
registration,” it was “unlikely” that Congress intended a Section 11 remedy 
for anyone other than original shareholders.154 To rule otherwise would 
extend the scope of Section 11 liability too far.155 The court noted, however, 
that aftermarket shareholders would be able to pursue remedy under Section 
12(a)(2).156 Barnes effectively limited Section 11 claims to original 
shareholders, as it is extremely difficult for an aftermarket shareholder to 
                                                 
145.  Id. at 441. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. at 441–42. 
148.  Sale, supra note 127 (citing Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1967)). 
149.  Id. (citing Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271). 
150.  Id. (citing Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272). 
151.  Id. (citing Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272–73). 
152.  Id. at 445; see also Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272. 
153.  Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272–73. 
154.  Id. at 272. 
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show that their particular shares, which have changed ownership multiple 
times, were originally issued in connection to an offering containing a 
material misstatement or omission.157  
Though Barnes established tracing as a requirement, potential plaintiffs 
were not provided with an explanation of how to meet that requirement until 
Kirkwood v. Taylor.158 In Kirkwood, both individual stockholders and a 
class of stockholders attempted to trace their securities to an allegedly 
misleading registration statement.159 The plaintiffs used four different 
methods to trace the origin of their securities and, in dismissing three of 
those methods as insufficient, the court established the steps needed to 
successfully trace a security.160 
The first method considered by the court was direct tracing. To show that 
a plaintiff’s shares qualify under direct tracing, the plaintiff must show: 1) 
a broker indicated interest for the plaintiff buyer in an imminent security 
issuance; 2) the customer received a copy of the preliminary prospectus for 
the issuance; 3) a purchase order was written indicating an offering purchase 
on the part of the plaintiff buyer; 4) the purchase price matched the offering 
price of the stock in question; 5) a lack of commission existed for the broker; 
6) a confirmation slip with language related to the offering was created; and 
7) a special brokerage firm code, matching the securities transaction, 
exists.161 Plaintiffs have standing only for those shares they can trace using 
this method.162 As such, only original shareholders can effectively trace 
their securities under direct tracing.163 
The second method considered, and eventually dismissed, by the court 
in Kirkwood was fungible-mass tracing based upon statistical probability.164 
For this argument, plaintiff shareholders claimed that because brokers keep 
securities in holding accounts, thereby creating one fungible mass of 
securities, no one can know with certainty which type of security is 
transferred to an aftermarket shareholder—one from the original offering, 
or one from a subsequent offering.165 Accordingly, the plaintiffs argued that 
statistics should be permitted to show that it was more likely than not their 
securities were issued as part of the original offering made in relation to the 
material misstatement or omission.166 The court acknowledged that 
                                                 
157.  Sale, supra note 127, at 445. 
158.  590 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Minn. 1984). 
159.  Id. at 1378. 
160.  Id. at 1378–83. 
161.  Id. at 1378. 
162.  Id.. 
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although plaintiffs need not show proof beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy 
the tracing doctrine, proof that one’s shares “might” have been issued 
pursuant to a registration statement is insufficient.167 It noted, however, that 
future developments in the precision of statistical analysis could render 
fungible-mass tracing a workable method.168 
A third method, called contrabroker tracing, was also proffered by the 
Kirkwood plaintiffs.169 The plaintiffs proposing this method claimed they 
had purchased their shares from a broker who, in turn, had purchased the 
shares from another broker in the stock.170 If the second broker was an 
underwriter for the original offering, the shareholders argued, their shares 
could be traced to that original offering.171 The court dismissed this tracing 
method, stating that it would require some type of assurance that the 
broker’s account contained only offering shares purchased from the 
underwriter at the exact moment plaintiffs purchased their shares from the 
broker.172 The plaintiffs could offer no such assurance.173 
Lastly, plaintiff shareholders argued for heritage tracing.174 They 
claimed that because they could compare their individual certificates to 
stock certificates issued in the original offering, they could use the code 
numbers on those certificates to link their shares to the original offering.175 
The court responded that because total shares in the original offering 
exceeded total shares recorded on the individual certificates, there was no 
way to determine if any of the aftermarket shares were truly linked to the 
offering document.176  
Thus, only direct tracing could be used to assert standing for a Section 
11 claim.177 Other courts have subsequently extended this direct tracing 
requirement to claims brought under Section 12(a)(2) as well.178 
                                                 
167.  Id. at 1380. 
168.  Id. at 1378–81. 
169.  Id. at 1381. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. 
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174.  Id. at 1382–83. 
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Supp. 2d 216 (D. Del. 2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 381 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); Prof'l Serv. 
Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, No. CIV. A. 90-1326-B, 1992 WL 403639 (D. Kan. July 14, 1992) (same); 
Warden v. Crown Am. Realty Tr., No. CIV. A. 96-25J, 1998 WL 725946 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1998), 
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C. The Tracing Doctrine’s Repercussions for Claims Brought Under 
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act 
Judicial implementation of the tracing doctrine has precluded plaintiffs 
from making successful Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims in all but a small 
minority of cases.179 Not only does direct tracing impede aftermarket 
shareholders attempting to bring a claim under either Sections 11 or 
12(a)(2), but it also restricts the claims of original shareholders who cannot 
fulfill the rigorous, seven-step direct tracing method outlined in 
Kirkwood.180 At times, the judicial burdens imposed by the tracing doctrine 
confuse plaintiffs and even defy logic. In Stack v. Lobo, for instance, the 
court dismissed a Section 12(a)(2) claim because in their complaint, the 
plaintiffs failed to directly trace their shares and prove they were original 
purchasers.181 Such a ruling would make sense, given judicial precedent 
regarding the tracing requirement, if the defendant corporation had 
conducted multiple securities offerings.182 However, the defendant in 
question had only issued securities once, in their initial public offering 
(“IPO”).183 Therefore, plaintiffs were automatically original 
shareholders.184 Subsequent cases have echoed this line of thinking for both 
Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) claims.185 
Such a restricted construction of standing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) 
of the Securities Act “diminishes [its] remedial purpose”186 The Securities 
Act was passed to motivate issuers to accurately disclose critical 
information to prospective securities purchasers.187 The tracing doctrine 
                                                 
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1293, 1309 (D. Del. 1992) (same); Bennett v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 785 F. Supp. 559, 
561–62 (D. S.C. 1992); Bank of Denver v. Se. Capital Grp., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (D. Colo. 
1991) (same); T. Rowe Price New Horizons Fund, Inc. v. Preletz, 749 F. Supp. 705, 708 n.1 (D. Md. 
1990) (same); Grinsell v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 744 F. Supp. 931, 932–34 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (same); 
Leonard v. Stuart–James Co., 742 F. Supp. 653, 658 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (same); Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 
720 F. Supp. 8, 10–12 (D. D.C. 1989) (same); Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc. v. Summit Coffee Co., 858 
S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App. 1993), writ denied (Mar. 30, 1994), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 514 U.S. 
1001 (1995), and opinion withdrawn in part, 934 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App. 1996), writ dismissed by 
agreement (Oct. 24, 1996) (same); Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 823 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ill.), 
aff'd, 12 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1993) (same); In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. 93-521, 1993 
WL 623308 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1993) (same). 
179.  Sale, supra note 127, at 464. 
180.  Id. 
181.  903 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
182.  Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272. 
183.  Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1375. 
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subverts this legislative motive, however, by eviscerating the two main 
means of subjecting securities offerors to private liability—Sections 11 and 
12(a)(2)188 Rather than providing private plaintiffs with an opportunity for 
redress, the tracing doctrine has altered Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) so severely 
that, in the words of one scholar, they are now merely a “sword in the hands 
of defendants.”189 
D. The Potential for Decentralized Public Ledgers to Revitalize Sections 
11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act 
Although the tracing doctrine remains a stringent requirement, the 
implementation of decentralized public ledgers into securities markets will 
foster plaintiff success in achieving the standing now required to bring 
claims under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Delaware’s 
nascent system for issuing distributed ledger shares will be employed as an 
exemplar to illustrate how ledger shares can facilitate plaintiff standing 
under the tracing doctrine. 
When distributed ledger shares are issued by a Delaware corporation, 
each share purchased by an original purchaser will be permanently logged 
in Delaware’s decentralized public ledger for stocks.190 When those shares 
are subsequently sold and repurchased by aftermarket purchasers, each 
ongoing transfer of ownership will be chronologically linked and stored in 
the ledger using consensus mechanisms.191 Thus, for the first time in their 
history, shares will no longer be fungible goods.192 Rather than just being 
able to show how many shares they own in a company, distributed ledger 
shareholders will be able to show which specific shares they own in a 
company.193 Shareholders will also be able to access the complete 
transactional history of their shares, from the first offering to any later 
aftermarket transfers or purchases, at any time by merely accessing the 
ledger copy stored on their computers.194  
A decentralized public ledger for securities thus will enable shareholder 
plaintiffs to easily meet the tracing requirements for Section 11 and 12(a)(2) 
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claims. Consider the direct tracing method outlined in Kirkwood.195 The 
court described a string of factors that, if shown, indicate a plaintiff fulfilled 
the direct tracing requirement. These factors include 1) that a broker 
indicated interest for the plaintiff buyer in an imminent security issuance; 
2) the customer received a copy of the preliminary prospectus for the 
issuance; 3) a purchase order was written indicating an offering purchase on 
the part of the plaintiff buyer; 4) the purchase price matched the offering 
price of the stock in question; 5) a lack of commission existed for the broker; 
6) a confirmation slip with language related to the offering was created; and 
7) a special brokerage firm code, matching the securities transaction, 
exists.196 With distributed ledger shares, however, secondary proof methods 
such as purchase orders and firm codes will no longer be required to link a 
plaintiff’s shares to an offering. Rather, the share itself will be linked to the 
offering via a substantial, traceable chain of digital data permanently stored 
in a decentralized public ledger.197 To fulfill direct tracing requirements, a 
plaintiff will simply have to provide the court with a copy of the ledger. The 
result is an easier, cheaper tracing method that will promote private redress 
for securities fraud. 
By increasing the type and number of plaintiffs capable of showing 
standing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2), securities-based decentralized 
public ledgers will better fulfill the underlying purpose and promise of the 
Securities Act. As previously noted, Congress enacted the Securities Act in 
reaction to the market crash of 1929.198 It was intended to foster financial 
transparency by requiring companies issuing securities to make substantive, 
public disclosures.199 This was meant to correct the informational 
asymmetry that ineluctably separates securities issuers from securities 
purchasers.200 Thus, the statutes were written to ensure that securities fraud 
is not just a matter of public welfare, but also a cause of private injury.201 If 
securities issuers are not subject to private liability for material 
misstatements or omissions regarding the issuance of their securities, they 
have less incentive to perform due-diligence operations.202 Yet, by imposing 
a nearly impossible tracing burden on potential plaintiffs, courts have 
“departed from the basic canon of statutory interpretation—interpreting the 
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statute to give it meaning.”203 For, although no language in either Section 
11 or Section 12(a)(2) restricts aftermarket shareholders from seeking 
redress for securities fraud, the tracing doctrine has prevented aftermarket, 
and even some original, purchasers from making such claims.204 The advent 
of decentralized public ledgers will allow both subsets of shareholders to 
meet their direct tracing obligations and seek appropriate redress. 
E. Potential Problems and Proposed Solutions 
Although decentralized public ledgers will benefit securities buyers, 
there are potential problems attendant to such a technological development. 
For instance, enabling aftermarket shareholders to trace their securities all 
the way back to an original offering renews the very concerns that led the 
Barnes court to concoct the tracing doctrine in the first place. If any 
aftermarket shareholder can demonstrate standing through tracing on a 
decentralized stock ledger, increased accessibility to Section 11 and 
12(a)(2) remedies may result in prohibitively large plaintiff groups.205   
Every time a share is traded, the group of potential aftermarket 
shareholder plaintiffs grows. In 2016, there were over 1.8 billion trades 
made on the New York Stock Exchange alone.206 Thus, over its lifetime, a 
single share of stock may be traded thousands, or even millions, of times. 
With a decentralized public ledger to chronologically track and record each 
of these share trades, the resulting list of shareowners will concurrently 
stretch to the thousands or millions. In the case of fraud related to a set of 
shares, a decentralized ledger would thus generate an extensive pool of both 
original and aftermarket potential plaintiffs.  
However, despite the potential for decentralized ledgers to dramatically 
increase plaintiff pools for private security fraud claims, there are 
safeguards that will prevent Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims from becoming 
judicially untenable or unfairly punitive. First, reducing the burdens of 
direct tracing through decentralized stock ledger technologies will not 
automatically result in massive payouts by corporate defendants to millions 
of plaintiffs. Rather, it will only ease the tracing requirement so that fewer 
“potentially valid claims” raised by plaintiffs are eliminated “at the pleading 
stage.”207 To be successful, plaintiffs will still have to prove that a material 
misstatement or omission exists and that it affected the value of their 
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securities.208 Further, aftermarket plaintiffs who purchased their stock more 
than twelve months after the initial offering will still have to demonstrate 
reliance upon that material misstatement or omission.209 Thus, although 
decentralized public ledgers have the potential to increase the number of 
plaintiffs who can meet initial pleading burdens, they will not concurrently 
increase the liability of defendants.210 Decentralized public ledgers do not 
eliminate the need for substantial, extensive discovery into the nature and 
effect of an alleged misstatement or omission. 
Second, although proponents of the tracing doctrine have argued that 
modifying or eliminating the tracing requirement would increase the 
likelihood of frivolous shareholder complaints, such arguments belie the 
structure of the Securities Act itself.211 Drafters constructed the Securities 
Act to limit frivolous suits.212 For instance, Section 11(e) of the Securities 
Act permits courts to require that plaintiffs post a bond for costs and 
attorneys’ fees, allows the court to assess such costs,213 and states that the 
court may actively manage and limit discovery to diminish frivolous claims 
or claims made solely for settlement.214 Although decentralized public 
ledgers may increase prospective plaintiff groups, they do nothing to assist 
these plaintiff groups with court-assessed costs or settlement-based 
claims.215 
Lastly, the public interest purposes of the Securities Act must be recalled 
before equating an increase in aftermarket purchaser plaintiffs with unfair 
defendant outcomes. The Securities Act was drafted under the premise that 
strict private liability would incentivize securities issuers to disclose 
truthful, complete information to their buyers.216 Under these parameters, 
expediting the ability of aftermarket purchasers to bring fraud claims should 
encourage issuers to be even more diligent in their disclosures. Further, 
defendants will only be required to pay original and aftermarket shareholder 
plaintiffs if they choose to settle a case or if they are found guilty of 
committing fraud.217 As previously noted, the Securities Act already 
includes safeguards to protect defendants from frivolous settlements.218 If 
defendants are found guilty and are required to issue redress to large 
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plaintiff groups, it would only further the remedial intent underlying the 
Securities Act.219  
CONCLUSION 
Decentralized public ledgers are a technological innovation poised to 
revolutionize data storage and digital transactions. Much scholarship has 
been devoted to examining how such ledgers affect currencies, the financial 
markets, contract execution, value transfer, and other spheres of activity. T 
his Note has channeled that scholarship to expose and analyze a unique legal 
juxtaposition—the ability of technologically advanced decentralized 
ledgers to reinvigorate one of the oldest components of American securities 
law, the Securities Act of 1933.  
Part I detailed the history of decentralized public ledger systems. It 
explained how these systems function, provided examples of different 
system frameworks, and concluded with a broad overview of current and 
future applications of this technology in the financial markets. 
Part II focused on a specific subset of the financial markets, the securities 
markets. It considered how decentralized public ledgers could be applied to 
securities. It then described how both the SEC and Delaware plan to 
implement and regulate decentralized public ledger securities. 
Finally, Part III of this Note concluded that applying decentralized public 
ledger technology to securities transactions will enable more plaintiffs to 
achieve standing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. It 
detailed how decentralized ledger stocks will permit a wider range of 
plaintiffs to meet the burden of the judicially-imposed tracing doctrine. By 
transforming the tracing doctrine from a nigh-insurmountable obstacle to a 
mere computer search on a ledger database, more plaintiffs will be able to 
seek relief under the private causes of action in the Securities Act. Although 
widening the potential plaintiff pool could create logistical issues for courts 
and defendants, the internal structure and pleading requirements of the 
Securities Act will effectively limit frivolous suits. This, in turn, will better 
fulfill the statutory language and remedial intent of Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) 
of the Securities Act of 1933.  
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